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Abstract
Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner’s
dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential
mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the
density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner’s dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is
still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high
mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of
cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological
dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety
of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession,
sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which
leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism), thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent
ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.
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Introduction
Cooperation within and between species abounds in nature
ranging from microbial interactions to the mutualistic behavior of
animals and humans [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]. Cooperative individuals
can benefit others at cost to themselves, and can be easily exploited
by selfish individuals that only receive benefit without cost (or
contribution). As such, cooperation seems incompatible with
Darwinian natural selection. However, mutual cooperation can
often produce higher benefit than costs for both actors. It is, thus,
necessary to seek mechanisms underpinning such a social dilemma
[10] and the cooperation evolution.
Multiple hypotheses have been proposed for cooperation to
initialize and sustain in selfish populations, including kin selection
[11,12,13], group selection [14] and reciprocal altruism [15]. The
most fundamental requirement for the evolution of cooperation is
to break the random interaction among individuals and to
construct assortative encounters between cooperative individuals
[16,17]. Assortative interactions can guarantee a close relatedness
between the actor and recipient, and thus ensure the satisfaction of
the Hamilton rule [12], stating that cooperation can be favored by
natural selection if the benefit to cooperate, after discounted by the
relatedness between players, is still larger than the cost [12,18].
The Hamilton rule portrays the general condition for the evolution
of cooperation and has been confirmed under different altruistic
mechanisms [17,19,20].
Cooperative behaviors in evolutionary games can be catego-
rized into two groups: (i) those that benefit both the recipient and
the actor and (ii) those that benefit only the recipient [21,22]. The
former is often formulated by the snowdrift game for pairwise
interactions [23] and by the public good game for group
interactions [24,25,26], whilst the latter by the prisoner’s dilemma
game (PDG) [27]. The analyses of these classic evolutionary
games, for instance using replicator equations, often assume
infinite or constant population size for simplicity, and reflect the
frequency-dependent selection [28,29,30]. This assumption inev-
itably ignores the population dynamics.
However, mounting evidence indicates that ecological and
evolutionary dynamics could be commensurate in time and
interact in a feedback loop [31]. Specifically, the evolution of
cooperation can be facilitated by ecological factors such as the
demographic stochasticity [32,33,34], empty sites [35], greater
frequency of catastrophes [36], moderate habitat destruction and
fragmentation [37,38,39] and intermediate disturbance [40]. In
return, this behavioral evolution can also affect the dynamics and
persistence of populations [37,38,39]. These results suggest that
the density-dependent selection, in contrast to the frequency-
dependent selection, could promote the evolution of cooperation
[41].
The exclusion of cooperation in the social dilemma can be
ascribed to the exploitation of cooperators by defectors without
compensation. By reducing the population density and, thus, the
encounter probability, cooperators are able to mitigate the
exploitation by defectors. Consequently, the population density
will climb due to accumulated benefits from mutual cooperation,
which in turn begets the revival of defection and, consequently, the
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decline of population density, forming an eco-evolutionary
feedback cycle. Such interplay between ecological forces and
evolutionary games can foster the coexistence of cooperators and
defectors in a public goods game, in which cooperation benefits
both the recipient and the actor [42,43,44]. Here, we focus on the
prisoner’s dilemma games, in which cooperation only benefits the
recipient, not the actor itself (i.e. an altruistic behavior).
To reveal how and to what extent the population dynamics and
the eco-evolutionary feedback loop can affect the evolution of
cooperation, we here examine the dynamics of an ecological PDG
using an extension of replicator equations. Our model distinguish-
es two life-history stages in the population (i.e. interaction and
dispersion) and assumes that the interactions (or games) between
individuals happen locally and natal dispersal globally [45]. An
enhanced relatedness between locally interacting individuals could
rise from delayed natal dispersal (e.g. cooperative breeding)
[46,47,48] or sibling-coalition dispersal [49,50]. Our model differs
from those for viscous populations where distances of interaction
and offspring movement are considered equal [51,52,53]. In this
study, we focus on the invasion dynamics of cooperation and the
alteration of invasion condition in ecological games, and
emphasize that cooperation can be promoted by the enhanced
relatedness between players rising from the ecological dynamics.
Using the stability analysis and bifurcation on phase planes, we
portray the entire landscape of the evolutionary dynamics of
cooperation in ecological PDGs.
Analysis
Ecological Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
A cooperator (C) can produce a benefit of b to its recipients at a
personal cost of c (bwcw0), whereas a defector (D) produces no
benefit and bears no cost. This derives the following payoff matrix
for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG) [23]:
C D
C
D
b{c {c
b 0
 
: ð1Þ
Following Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza [16], we define the assortative
encounter as: (i) an individual interacts with individuals of the
same-strategy at a probability of m, and (ii) randomly plays game
with other individuals, including those from the same strategy, at a
probability of 12m. Thus, in a population with a proportion of x
cooperators and y defectors, the mean payoff for a cooperator is
(mz(1{m)x)(b{c){(1{m)yc and for a defector (1{m)xb.
Specifically, assortment is a necessary condition for the evolution
of cooperation in the ecological context, which could be imposed
by (i) delayed natal dispersal [46,47,48], (ii) sibling-coalition
dispersal [49,50], or (iii) kin recognition [54]. In the frequency-
dependent selection [28,29], population size is constant, xzy~1;
in the density-dependent selection here, treating x and y as the
proportions of habitat occupied respectively by cooperators and
defectors, population size is variable according to ecological
dynamics, xzyv1.
To incorporate population dynamics into an evolutionary PDG,
we consider a habitat consisting of suitable sites; each site can be
occupied by either a cooperator or a defector, or remain empty.
An empty site can become occupied by a new individual, whereas
the death of an individual leaves its dwelling site empty. An
individual is assumed to only produce offspring with the same
strategy, which go on to randomly seek empty sites via global natal
dispersal for colonization. The population dynamics can be
described by the following differential equations [42],
dx
dt
~cxx(1{x{y){dx
dy
dt
~cyy(1{x{y){dy,
ð2Þ
where cx and cy are the birth rate of cooperators and defectors,
respectively; d denotes the death rate (i.e. mortality). The density-
dependent selection is incorporated in this ecological PDG
because each individual has a probability (1{m)(1{x{y) of
failing to encounter other players. Following van Baalen and Rand
[51], we let the birth rate be density dependent and equal a
baseline reproduction rate (m) plus the payoff from playing games
with others:
cx~mz(mz(1{m)x)(b{c){(1{m)yc:
cy~mz(1{m)xb
ð3Þ
It is also worth noting that, by keeping the birth rate cx and cy
constant, this model becomes Levins’ [55] metapopulation model
[56]. By setting a frequency-dependent death rate d~(1{x{y)c
(where c~(cxxzcyy)=(xzy) indicates the mean fitness of the
population), this model turns into the evolutionary replicator
equations [28,42]. Clearly, our model of ecological PDG not only
represents the ecological dynamics of birth and death (i.e. the
colonization and extinction in metapopulations), but also the
dynamics of evolutionary games in animals. We, thus, explored the
invasion condition of cooperation, as well as the complicated
dynamics of the eco-evolutionary feedback, in this ecological PDG
model.
Invasion Condition
When there is no assortment among individuals (m~0), the
cooperative strategy cannot invade a defective population, whereas
the defective strategy can invade a cooperative population due to
the initial condition cxvcy. This defines the social dilemma, and
suggests that assortment is a necessary condition for the
cooperation evolution in the ecological PDG. When there is
assortment among individuals (mw0), the condition for cooper-
ation to increase in the population can be obtained by the
inequality cxwcy, which gives:
rbwc ð4Þ
where r represents the probability for a cooperator to have a game
with another cooperator (fCjC~½mz(1{m)x=½mz(1{m)
(xzy)) minus the probability for a defector to have a game with
a cooperator (fCjD~(1{m)x=½mz(1{m)(xzy)); that is,
r~fCjC{fCjD. Let X and Y be the random variables of the states
of the actor and recipient ( = 1 for cooperator and = 0 for
defector), then r is equal to the covariance between X and Y,
Cov(X,Y), divided by the variance of X, Var(X) (see the detail
deduction in Appendix S1):
r~
Cov(X ,Y )
Var(X )
: ð5Þ
This is a widely-used measure of the relatedness [18,53,57], and
therefore, the inequality (4) of our system represents the Hamilton
rule (rB.C) [12,18], where r, B ( = b) and C ( = c) represent the
relatedness, fitness benefit and fitness cost, respectively. Under the
Cooperation Invasion in Ecological Games
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frequency-dependent selection (xzy~1), we derive that the
relatedness is equal to the assortment (r~m). However, under the
density-dependent selection (xzyv1), we have rwm. Moreover,
the relatedness (r) increased with the decrease of population density
(xzy). As according to the Hamilton rule (eqn. 4), cooperation
evolution becomes easier (i) under density-dependent selection and
(ii) especially when the population density is low.
When the proportion of cooperators in the population is initially
trivial (x~0), the inequality (4) can be rewritten as:
m
mz(1{m)y
 
bwc, ð6Þ
Clearly, the cooperation strategy can easily invade a defective
population if the density of the defective population (y) is low.
Even if a pure-defector population cannot persist (dwm),
cooperators can still colonize the empty habitat if the death rate
was relatively low mvdvmzm(b{c). When the death rate was
moderate mzm(b{c)vdv(b{czm)2=4(1{m)(b{c), the col-
onization by cooperators can be successful only if the proportion of
initial cooperators reaches a threshold (i.e. an Allee effect [58]),
(1{2m)(b{c){m{
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
(b{czm)2{4d(b{c)(1{m)
q
2(1{m)(b{c)
:
Figure 1. The dependence of dynamical behaviors on model parameters. Brown part and part iv, mwd, have two boundary equilibriums:
one for cooperators; the other for defectors. Yellow part, mvdvmzm(b{c), has only one boundary equilibrium for cooperators. Cyan part,
mzm(b{c)vdv(b{czm)2=4(1{m)(b{c), has two boundary equilibriums both for cooperators. The area encircled by blue curves indicates the
existence of interior equilibrium of cooperation-defect coexistence. The three red lines on (A) and (B), from bottom to top, indicate the node-focus
bifurcation, Hopf bifurcation and the heteroclinic bifurcation, respectively, and the red lines on (C) and (D) indicate the node-focus bifurcation. Area
on the left side of the vertical dotted line indicates the invasion condition for cooperation in the frequency-dependent selection (i.e. mbwc).
Parameters are m=b~0:1 and m= 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.55, respectively, for panel (A) to (D).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027523.g001
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When the death rate was too high (dw(b{czm)2=4(1{m)
(b{c)) even cooperators cannot be sustained.
Once the cooperators have established themselves in the empty
habitat, the invasion of defectors, in turn, can become possible if
m
mz(1{m)x
 
bvc ð7Þ
This inequality implies that a cooperative population with low
density can prevent the invasion of defectors. When both
inequality (6) and (7) were satisfied, the mutual invasion of
cooperators and defectors can lead to the coexistence of these two
strategies, and potentially incur complicated population dynamics
(see below). This interesting parameter range of complicated
dynamic behaviors does not exist in the frequency-dependent
selection (x~1 or y~1), leading to the Hamilton rule of mbwc
for the invasion of cooperation and mbvc for the invasion of
defection.
Evolutionary Dynamics
There were at most two boundary equilibriums (i.e. pure
strategy) in the system (eqn 2): (i) two boundary equilibriums if
dvm; one for pure defection and the other for pure cooperation;
(ii) no boundary equilibrium for defectors and only one boun-
dary equilibrium for cooperators if mvdvmzm(b{c); (iii)
two boundary equilibrium for cooperators if mzm(b{c)vdv
(b{czm)2=4(1{m)(b{c). The system has at most one interior
equilibrium; it depicts the coexistence of cooperators and defectors
and appears when the following condition is met:
m(c{mb)
c(1{m)
vdv m(c{mb)
c(1{m)
z
mb(b{c)(c{mb)
c2(1{m)
: ð8Þ
No interior equilibrium exists if mbwc. The interior equilibrium
changed from a stable node to a focus when the eigenvalue of the
Jacobian matrix changed from a negative real number to an
imaginary number. Furthermore, the interior equilibrium can
become unstable and lead to a limit cycle, determined by the Hopf
bifurcation (Appendix S2). When there were two boundary
equilibriums for cooperators, a heteroclinic bifurcation occurred
once the limit circle had touched the unstable boundary
equilibrium (Appendix S2), breaking the local stable structure on
the phase plane and causing population extinction (Animation S1).
These boundary and interior equilibriums, as well as the
bifurcation conditions, divide the parameter space into at most 15
different parts with the decrease of assortment, m (Figure 1); each
part indicates a particular behavior of dynamics (Figure 2).
Notably, the condition for cooperation invasion in frequency-
dependent selection (mbwc) occupies only one part in the
parameter space (left of the dashed lines in Figure 1). High death
rate (mortality) and high cost to cooperate were shown to be
important for generating damped oscillation (i.e. a focus; Figure 2
Figure 2. The behaviors of the dynamics of ecological prisoner’s dilemma games on a phase plane. Plots (i)–(xv) correspond to part i–xv
in Fig. 1, respectively. Solid circles represent stable equilibriums; open circles represent unstable equilibriums. Parameters are m~0:1, m~0:1, b~1 for
all diagrams, except c~0:05 and d~0:08 for (i), c~0:12 and d~0:08 for (ii), c~0:3 and d~0:09 for (iii), c~0:39 and d~0:05 for (iv), c~0:05 and
d~0:15 for (v), c~0:15 and d~0:15 for (vi), c~0:25 and d~0:15 for (vii), c~0:39 and d~0:137 for (viii), c~0:05 and d~0:25 for (ix), c~0:16 and
d~0:22 for (x), c~0:22 and d~0:22 for (xi), c~0:27 and d~0:2 for (xii), c~0:39 and d~0:18 for (xiii), c~0:53 and d~0:18 for (xiv), and c~0:4 and
d~0:27 for (xv).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027523.g002
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iii, vii, xi) and periodic oscillation (i.e. a limit circle; Figure 2 viii,
xii) in population dynamics. A spatial simulation showed that the
dynamics behavior of periodic oscillation can generate complicat-
ed spatial patterns (Figure 3; see Appendix S3 and Animation S2
for details). In the current density-dependent ecological PDG,
parameters lie in the combined zone of the entire brown, yellow
and cyan parts of Figure 1 can potentially lead to the evolution of
cooperation. The condition of cooperation evolution, thus, has
been largely expanded and relaxed in the ecological PDG;
complex behaviors of dynamics can be expected.
Results and Discussion
A social dilemma arises from the random interactions among
individuals, and thus the key to unlocking this puzzle lies in
creating nonrandom assortative interactions [16,17]. Because the
relatedness between players can be depicted by the difference
between the probability for a cooperator to have a game with
another cooperator and the probability for a defector to have a
game with a cooperator (Appendix S1), the existence of assortative
interactions becomes essential for the relatedness being positive.
Our analysis thus confirmed the importance of assortment in
facilitating the invasion and persistence of cooperation in
ecological evolutionary games.
Moreover, low population density reduces the random encoun-
ter probability and exploitation from defectors; it further increases
the relatedness being greater than the assortment (m) and thus
favors the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma
game. This is consistent with Hauret et al.’s [42] results that
cooperation can be promoted when there is a decrease of
population density in the ecological public goods game. Evidence
from Australian mountain possums indeed shows a significant
negative relationship between the relatedness and the availability
of local tree dens [59]. A low population density can reduce the
exploitation by defectors and thus mitigate the tragedy of
commons [60]. Therefore, factors that can reduce population
density, such as empty sites [35], habitat saturation [53,61],
enhanced predation risk [62], habitat deterioration [37,38] and
fragmentation [39], provide potential solutions to the social
dilemma.
This model is distinct from those models for viscous populations
(an alternative way to consider ecological dynamics) [51,52,53] in
two aspects: (i) in our model natal dispersal distance of offspring
when colonizing empty sites is much longer than the interacting
range between gaming individuals as confirmed in many animals
(e.g. [45,46,47,48,49,50]), whereas viscous population models
consider a similar distance of natal dispersal to the interacting (or
gaming) range; (ii) there is cost to an individual in the viscous
populations even when surrounded only by empty sites, in contrast
to no cost in our model. Evidently, the viscous populations could be
certain bacterial strains that interact through the diffusion and
absorption of biochemical products generated through metabolism,
whereas our model is more suitable for depicting social animals (e.g.
mate competition and coalition between male lions [63]).
The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the
evolution of cooperation: the cooperative behavior can be favored
Figure 3. Spatial patterns of the ecological PDG on a 4016401 lattice. The color brightness indicates the probabilities that each site is
occupied by a cooperator (red) or a defector (green), or remains empty (black) (as in Wakano et al. 2009). Initially, the central site is occupied by a
cooperator with a probability of 0.1 or by a defector with the same probability, and the other sites are completely empty. Parameters are the same as
Fig. 2 viii as for the dynamics of periodic oscillation. First snapshot is taken at time 1500; the others start from time 4500, with a temporal interval of
1500 time steps. See Animation S2 and Appendix S3 for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027523.g003
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if the benefit to cooperate discounted by the relatedness between
the actor and recipient is still higher than the cost to cooperate
[12,18]. Variants of this rule have been illustrated under various
evolutionary mechanisms [17,19,51,53]. Assortative interactions
between individuals play an important role in leading to the
relatedness between players and are thus essential for the
Hamilton rule [16,17].
Population density can also affect the Hamilton rule by
mediating the relatedness between players and the benefit and
cost to cooperate, as in the ecological games of viscous populations
[51,52,53]. However, in these models for viscous populations, the
empty site is an implicit player: cooperators surrounded by empty
sites only pay tribute yet without return and thus lose against
empty sites. In our model, games only happen between
individuals; there will be neither benefit nor cost for individuals
surrounded only by empty sites. A comparison of these two kinds
of models (see Appendix S4) suggests cooperation evolves easier in
games only between individuals (our model) than games where
cooperators compulsorily pay cooperative cost to the surrounding
regardless of whether the surrounding is empty or not (as in the
model for viscous populations [51,53]).
When the baseline birth rate is less than the death rate, a
defective population is incapable of surviving in the absence of
cooperators. In contrast, a cooperative population can be
sustained in such harsh environments by compensating the deficit
in the population growth rate with the benefit gained from mutual
cooperation. Parallel evidence is rich in ecology, showing that
positive interactions between species (e.g. facilitation) prevail in
stress environments, such as in desert and inter-tidal zones
[64,65,66]. This result further suggests an alternative evolutionary
sequence, in contrast to the one in classic evolutionary games.
Individuals are often thought to be selfish initially in classic
evolutionary games, while mutualism evolves afterwards. Here, we
suggest an alternative evolutionary sequence in harsh environ-
ment: cooperation (symbiosis or mutualism) first appears in harsh
environment, followed by the invasion of defection, which then
inevitably leads to a common tragedy, or the social dilemma
[67,68]. The pioneer species that colonizes a barren habitat, as in
the studies on community succession, are often symbiotic or social,
followed by exploiters (competitive species) [69,70].
In conclusion, for the evolution of cooperation, assortative
interaction is crucial [16,71], whereas harsh environments that
causes a high death rate and low population density can also serve
as an inducement for the cooperation evolution. Individuals in
harsh environment are prone to be cooperative in order to combat
the high death rate, with the cooperation benefits. Adding
ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens a much wider
window for the evolution of cooperation, and thus exhibits a
variety of dynamical behaviors.
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